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Abstract 
Computer Authentication is a critical component of 
most computer systems – especially those used in e-
Commerce activities over the internet.  Global access 
to information makes security, namely the 
authentication process, a critical design issue in these 
systems.  In what concerns to authentication, what is 
required is a reliable, hardware independent and 
efficient security system.  In this paper, we propose an 
extension to a keystroke dynamics based security 
system.  We provide evidence that completely software 
based systems can be as effective as expensive and 
cumbersome hardware based systems.  Our system is a 
behavioral based system that captures the normal 
typing patterns of a user and uses that information, in 
addition to standard login/password security to 
provide a system that is user-friendly and very effective 
at detecting imposters.  The results provide a means of 
dealing with enhanced security that is growing in 
demand in web-based applications based on E-
Commerce. 
1. Introduction 
With the increasing number of E-Commerce based 
organizations adopting a stronger consumer-orientated 
philosophy, Web services are also becoming more user 
orientated. For this strategy to be successful, the 
authentication (process of confirming an alleged 
identity) or identification (linking a user to an known 
identity) of the user must be done with accuracy.  
The traditional method for authentication in any 
information system is the pair login/password. But it is 
known that the quality of a password, measured by its 
resistance to attacks, depends of its complexity and, 
therefore, many of the deficiencies of the 
login/password systems arise from the limitations of 
the human memory [1]. Many information systems 
have increased their level of security by the use of 
biometric technologies, frequently in association with a 
card that stores and, sometimes, processes the personal 
data involved in this process. So, now, a user must 
present something he knows (password), something he 
owns (the card) and something he has (the biometrical 
data).  
Despite the generalization of the use of password 
systems in the Web, Web based applications do not 
include hardware based biometric technologies.  This 
would place an undue burden on the consumers to have 
the necessary hardware to support such a security 
based system.  What is ideally required is to have a 
hardware independent based security system that is as 
secure as hardware based systems, but without the 
added expense. It wouldn’t make sense to limit the 
sales of a site to users that own, for instance, a 
fingerprint reader. But the biometric technologies can 
measure, mainly, physical characteristics or 
behavioural characteristics and that can be done in a 
collaborative way (with the knowledge and active 
collaboration of the user) or in a stealthy way (without 
the knowledge of the user) [2].  For instance some 
behavioural biometrics do not require any special 
hardware. As an example, a voice recognition system 
which only requires a microphone that is now very 
common on personal computers, no longer presents an 
obstacle. But there is another requirement for 
authentication processes in Web based applications: 
the algorithm can’t be hardware demanding so that the 
server can authenticate a few thousands of users almost 
instantly. The algorithm of keystroke dynamics, a 
biometrics-based technology greatly enhances security 
by establishing a pattern in the particular way of a user 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Next Generation Web Services Practices (NWeSP’05) 
0-7695-2452-4/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE 
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Westminster. Downloaded on June 9, 2009 at 04:56 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
to type a text on a keyboard.  It was first proposed in 
the paper “an improved statistical keystroke dynamics 
algorithm” [2] complies with those requirements and, 
therefore, they represent a chance for Web based 
services to take a step forward in the direction of 
higher security in a realistic way. But the level of 
accuracy is still an issue and later we will present an 
improvement on that algorithm that results on a highest 
level of accuracy. 
2. Keystroke Dynamics – previous work  
As in many other problems, there have been two 
different approaches to the challenge of finding an 
algorithm for keystroke dynamics that minimizes the 
CER: machine-learning and deterministic algorithms.  
Among the solutions based on the machine learning 
we can find the work presented by Chen [3] which 
achieved a cross-over error rate (CER) less than 1% 
and a 0% false acceptance rate (FAR). Ord and Furnell 
[4] also tested this technology, with a 14 people group, 
to study the viability of applying it to the simple use of 
PINs (Personal Identification Numbers) typed on a 
numeric-pad. Unfortunately the results suggest that, for 
a large-scale use, the technology is not feasible.  
Deterministic algorithms have been applied to 
keystroke dynamics since the late 70’s. In 1980 Gaines 
[5] presented a report of his work to study the typing 
patterns of seven professional typists. The small 
number of volunteers and the fact that the algorithm is 
deducted from their data and not tested in other people 
later, results on a lower confidence on the FAR and 
FRR values presented. But the method used to 
establish a pattern was a breakthrough: a study of the 
time spent to type the same two letters (digraph), when 
together in the text. Since then, many algorithms based 
on Algebra and on Probability and Statistics have been 
presented. Joyce Gupta presented in 1990 [6] an 
algorithm to calculate a value that represents the 
distance between acquired keystroke latency times and 
correspondent times previously stored. In 1997 
Monrose and Rubin use the Euclidean Distance and 
probabilistic calculations based on the assumption that 
the latency times for one-digraph exhibits a Normal 
Distribution [7]. Later, in 2000, they also present an 
algorithm for identification, based on the similarity 
models of Bayes [8], and in 2001 they present an 
algorithm that uses polynomials and vector spaces to 
generate complex passwords from a simple one, using 
the keystroke pattern [9].  
The algorithms cited are a small example of the 
many approaches used to find adequate keystroke 
dynamics algorithms with a convenient CER. Many 
others could also be referred, all with different 
evaluation methods, different number of users involved 
(usually a limited number of users), different number 
of keystrokes required to enroll the system and 
different number of repetitive operations required to 
authenticate and/or identify the user. This diversity in 
the algorithm parameters and in the evaluation method 
makes the task of comparing their results a very 
difficult one. Furthermore, there is, in this subject, no 
concept of what is a representative data sample. The 
same algorithm presents different results when tested 
with different volunteer groups. The only way to 
compare two algorithms is to test it against the same 
group. 
Envisaging wide scale applications, like web-based 
applications (where this method is not executable now) 
one must consider the results only if the test user 
group’s size is considerably large. In this application 
domain one must remember that the computational 
effort necessary to execute the algorithm is a critical 
factor. 
Nevertheless, and for the record, according to  
Peacock [10] regarding keystroke dynamics, they 
reported FAR values from 0% to over 50%, the FRR 
varies from more them 25% to less then 1% and the 
numbers of users involved is usually between ten and 
one hundred. 
3. An lightweight algorithm  
The algorithm presented in [2] is a lightweight an 
enrollment and an authentication stage.  The enrolment 
process, made by the user once on the first use of the 
service, consists on typing the users usual password, or 
passphrase, twelve times. The data is stored and the 
average, the median and the standard deviation of the 
times for each digraph is calculated and stored along 
with the average, the median and the standard 
deviation for the total time spent on each 
password/passphrase. 
The authentication process is, in the user’s point of 
view, equal to any password method. He/she only has 
to introduce his/her password like he/she usually does. 
For each keystroke the algorithm will measure the time 
latency, defined as TLP, and compare it with the one 
stored. The comparison result will be a hit if and only 
if 
( ) TLP
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This same calculation is repeated for all the 
password/passphrase keystrokes, and the results are 
stored in a Boolean array. 
Then a sum A is calculated. The not hit values do 
not contribute to the sum A. The value 1 is added if the 
previous value is not a hit (or if it is the first value) and 
a value 1,5 is added if the previous value is a hit. The 
final value of A will decide if the authentication 
process succeeded, or not, according to the threshold 
defined by the system administrator. For instance, if 
the threshold is set on 70%, users will only be 
authenticated to the system if the value A obtained 
from a given attempt is over 70% of the highest 
possible value, which is given by: 
( ) 15.1*1__ +−charactersofnumber . Finally, if and 
only if, the login attempt is accepted, the oldest values 
stored for the latencies are substituted by the 
corresponding values collected in this successful 
attempt. This last procedure will allow the data stored 
to evolve with the user. 
The accuracy of the biometric systems is measured 
by the False Acceptance Rate – FAR, that measures the 
percentage of illegitimate attempts to login that are 
successful – and by the False Rejection Rate – FRR, 
that measures the percentage of legitimate user’s 
denied login attempts. The Crossover Error Rate, or 
Equal Error Rate, is the value of these rates when they 
are equal, for a determinate threshold (figure 1). The 
lowest the FAR, more accurate is the technology. 
FAR   FRR 
CER 
Threshold 
%
Figure 1 – The Crossover Error Rate (CER) is 
obtained at the point where FAR=FRR.
This algorithm presented a CER of 5,58% and it can 
achieve, at the lowest thresholds, a FRR of near zero 
that maximizes the comfort of the user. At the higher 
demanding thresholds the algorithm presents a near 
zero FAR, maximizing the security. The several 
obtainable rates can be found in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – False Acceptance Rates and False 
Rejection Rates for the several possible thresholds 
4. The performance factors 
Revett and Khan [11] concluded that adding 
keyboard partitioning reduces the impostor success rate 
(FAR). According to those results, access codes that 
contained letters from each of the partitions of Figure 
3, in a manner that forced the user to enter characters 
that were scattered across the keyboard, provide more 
accuracy to keystroke dynamics systems. Furthermore, 
the speed at which we enter our access codes may 
actually compromise our access code protection 
mechanism. According to those results, the best results 
are achieved when the user does not type at his 
maximum typing speed.  
Figure 3 – The keyboard partition into divided four 
disjoint zones proposed by Revett and Khan [11] 
But to impose a password or a typing speed to the 
user decreases the comfort level and in Web-based 
applications to lose 1% of the users can mean loosing 
some thousands. The large-scale factor increases the 
importance of keeping the system comfortable, non-
intrusive and with a low FRR. Therefore the keystroke 
dynamics algorithms must find a way to include user’s 
performance factors in the decision process, instead of 
forcing users to change their everyday patterns. 
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5. A new algorithm that scores the time 
latencies 
The need to include in the decision process the 
user’s performance factors (the same factors for 
everyone but maybe with different values for the 
corresponding variables used) generates the need to 
score the time latencies. We now propose to do that by 
multiplying the vector coordinates used to generate the 
sum A in the algorithm described in section four by 
several variables that must be adjusted for each user if 
we intend to maximize the accuracy. Unfortunately, we 
can not assume that the Web users are advanced 
technology users and, therefore, in this context we 
must instantiate the variables and find constants, k, that 
will maximize not each user’s CER but the general 
Web community’s CER. So, 
now ( )( )¦
=
=
n
i
ntfpkkkA
1
...21  , where n is the number 
of time latencies resultant from the password string, p
is the number of performance factors included in the 
decision process and ( )ntf  is the result of applying 
the previously described algorithm to the nth time 
latency.  
The work presented in the paper “Enhancing login 
security using keystroke hardening and keyboard 
gridding” [11] suggested that a good factor to start with 
could be the average typing speed and the empirical 
data showed that it’s weighing factor is 2=speedk .
Intuition says that users that are right-handed would be 
more systematic when changing from the left hand to 
the right hand and the cited work [11] indicated that 
the characters in contiguous areas (Figure 3) tend to 
have more stable time latencies. So we decided to give 
more credit to time latencies that resulted from typing 
two characters in contiguous zones going from left to 
right. Also in this case the best constant has the value 2 
(two). The result, as showed in the next section, was a 
reduction on the CER. 
6. Evaluation of the algorithm 
Establishing the error rates of a biometric 
technology is a complex issue. Studies have been made 
to normalize that evaluation, but the results are 
strongly oriented to physical biometrics and are still 
strongly dependent on the number of individuals 
involved in the process and, what is worse, of their 
characteristics. This means that, even with a large 
amount of data collected, the results can be very 
different if we change the group evaluated. This 
happens because it is very difficult to obtain a sample 
representative of the population, since we do not know 
how to characterize the population [2]. 
The used data was collected through a java applet 
installed on a web server and on personal laptops. In 
physical biometrics the user provides a given physical 
characteristic in different positions and/or conditions, 
but always the same characteristic. In behavioral 
biometrics what is presented each time there is an 
attempt to logon, is a different behavior, so the FAR 
and FRR must be calculated considering the number of 
attempts and not the number of users [2]. Anyway, on 
a Web environment there is no way to know if two 
attempts to login are from one or two users. The data 
collected resulted from 170.391 attempts to crash 143 
patterns of legitimate users (to calculate the FAR) and  
from 251 legitimate logins (to calculate the FRR). 
Both the previous algorithm, presented in [2] and 
the now proposed one were used with this data to 
establish error rates. The results showed that this 
algorithm has False Acceptance Rates that can be set 
close to zero (Figure 4) by defining higher threshold 
values (therefore maximizing the security levels) and 
False Rejection Rates that can also be set close to zero 
(Figure 5) by defining lower threshold values 
(therefore maximizing comfort and availability). 
Comparing the global results obtained with the new 
algorithm (Figure 6) with those obtained with the 
previous one (Figure 7), we can verify that the 
Crossover Error Rate was reduced from 5,58% to 
slightly less then 5%. We can also verify that the 
different thresholds of the new algorithm correspond to 
different levels of security, while in the previous one 
some thresholds, like 15.5 and 16 or 17.5 and 18 
corresponded to the same False Rejection Rate once 
some values were not reachable by the calculating 
process. 
Like with the other algorithm, by varying the 
thresholds a system administrator, or an IDS, can 
obtain a FAR value near 0%, a FRR value near 0%, or 
can establish a balance, somewhere between those 
extreme values, according to the particularly security 
needs. 
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Figure 4 – False Acceptance Rate achieved with the 
new algorithm for several possible thresholds 
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Figure 5 - False Rejection Rate achieved with the new 
algorithm for several possible thresholds 
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Figure 6 – False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection 
Rate for several possible thresholds and estimation of 
the Crossover Error Rate of the new algorithm 
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Figure 7 - False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection 
Rate for several possible thresholds and estimation of 
the Crossover Error Rate of the previous algorithm 
when tested with the new data. 
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7. Conclusions 
The results from this study suggests that keystroke 
dynamics can be an effective means to enhance login 
security. Our system, based on keystroke dynamics, is 
not overly burdensome to the user (with some 
threshold levels it can even be used without his 
knowledge), very cost-effective, and very efficient in 
terms of the overhead placed on an Internet based 
server.  We achieve a very low FAR/FRR (both can be 
placed near to 0%) and a very low CER (less then 5%), 
compatible with those produced by very expensive 
hardware based systems. In addition, we have begun 
investigating additional strategies that can be combined 
with keystroke hardening, such as keyboard 
partitioning.  Partitioning provides an added layer of 
security, but requires users to limit their selection of 
login IDs and passwords.  But if security is vitally 
important to the organisation – such as mission critical 
e-Commerce sites, then this is a small price to pay to 
remain in business.  A single successful attack can 
literally put a site into financial bankruptcy.  We will 
explore in addition, the effects of ID/password length 
and typing speed as additional methods to increase the 
security level of this system. 
Lastly, the system we propose is adaptable in that 
the stored signatures re automatically updated over 
time, evolving as users’ typing styles evolve over time.   
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